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Australia finds itself increasingly poised between its traditional security alliance 
with the United States, and the economic opportunities afforded by its relationship 
with China. As tensions rise and recede between the U.S. and China, Australia's 
future seems to precariously balance between two divergent geostrategic objectives. 
How does the Australian government choose between these objectives? Dominant 
theorisations of foreign policy behaviour from International Relations literature 
focuses primarily on the system level-of-analysis, largely failing to consider the 
influence of individuals on the international climate. This thesis investigates 
whether the individual influence of the last the Australian Prime Ministers has 
impacted upon Australia's relationship with China. The study utilises a multiple-
case study approach in order to analyse the foreign policy response of the Howard 
(1996-2007), Rudd (2007-2010) and Gillard (2010 - 2013) governments. Each case 
study investigates the foreign policy outcomes of each administration in terms of 
the economic relationship with China, the diplomatic response to Chinese domestic 
insecurities, and defence policy concerning China. Within each of these aspects, the 
foreign policy responses are considered as either cooperative or antagonistic 
policies. The study finds that while systemic forces contribute the overarching 
structure of Australian foreign policy concerns, the individual influence of the 
Prime Ministers' interpretation and response significantly influence the policy 
outcomes. Using these case studies of Australian foreign policy behaviour, the 
study argues that the mainstream understanding of the level-of-analysis problem is 
insufficient in explaining and predicting the foreign policy decisions of states. 
Rather, an alternative conceptual understanding of analytical levels as necessarily 
interacting is required. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that Australia's leaders 
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I. Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Australia's future appears increasingly poised between traditional security and 
economic prosperity. Situated at the divide between an historic alliance with the 
United States of America and an increasingly prosperous economic relationship with 
China, the future success of the nation seems to balance between two separate 
geostrategic objectives. The release of the "Australia in the Asian Century White 
Paper", in September 2013, marked the first official comprehensive analysis of 
Australia's strategic position in the Asian region. Noting China's substantial 
"economic and social" contributions to the region, the White Paper remarked on 
Australia's acceptance of China's military rise as a "natural, legitimate outcome of its 
growing economy and broadening interests" (Henry et al. 2012, 228). While China 
has long since played a central role in Australia's diplomatic periphery, this 
acknowledgement is partially reflective of the sheer scale and significance of China's 
growth over the previous two decades. As a result of this transformation, Australian 
policy makers are now presented with an entirely new set of challenges concerning 
the Sino-Australian relationship. 
 
The economic rise of China has occurred so rapidly, and on such a large scale, that it 
now arguably challenges the United States’ status as a global hegemon. As a result, 
the field of International Relations (IR) has reacted with a flurry of predictions 
concerning the nature of the international environment as it responds to China's 
future development. However, the reality of this analysis is far from clear-cut. IR 
theory encompasses such a vast array of theoretical perspectives, and categories of 
political phenomena, that international political outcomes are inevitably surrounded 
by fundamentally opposed interpretations and policy prescriptions. Thus, the future 
of Australia as a prosperous and secure nation within the Asia-Pacific region is 
firmly embedded within a complex and varied theoretical debate. In response to this 
complexity, this study seeks to engage with one specific aspect of this debate: the 
relationship between foreign policy outcomes and the so called ‘level-of-analysis’ 
problem in IR theory. Specifically, the study examines the role of individual-level 
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explanations of political outcomes in the determination of Australian foreign policy 
concerning China. 
 
The central research puzzle of this study is as follows: 
Has the individual influence of the last three Australian Prime Ministers impacted 
upon Australia's relationship with China? 
Embedded within this investigation are a number of derivative research questions: 
- First, how does Australia balance geopolitical and economic imperatives 
when making foreign policy?  
- Second, how significant are the personal attributes of leaders in determining 
the nature of this balance?  
- Third, how valuable is the observation of these individual-level variables to 
the broader analysis of the international environment? 
 
The significance of China's impact on the international environment, for now and for 
the foreseeable future, is undeniable. China is predicted to become the world's 
largest economy by the end of 2014 (The Economist 30 Apr. 2014). Emerging from a 
period of domestic turmoil and international belligerence, China has been 
transformed into an economic powerhouse on a global scale. Following Deng 
Xiaoping's sweeping economic reforms, the Chinese economy has achieved the 
phenomenal average growth rate of 10% per year. Even throughout the global 
economic crisis (GFC) in 2007-08, China managed to avoid the vast majority of the 
negative effects felt throughout the world, and maintained its programme of rapid 
development. Furthermore, despite its use of force in a number of international 
disputes since 1949, China has consistently maintained that these actions were 
"based solely on self-defence", and thus insists on its commitment to a peaceful rise 
(Wortzel 2002, 267-8). 
 
From the perspective of IR, the rise of China represents either the historic rise of a 
system altering revisionist power, or the peaceful assimilation of a once belligerent 
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nation into the established international society (Johnston 2003). As a result, the 
international society at large needs to encourage the continued economic growth of 
China, and, if necessary, contain its military advancement. Whether or not these two 
objectives are mutually exclusive is highly contested, and serves as the focus of 
much of the IR scholarship surrounding the topic. However, as this study argues, the 
level-of-analysis problem fundamentally contributes to the deeper underlying 
complexity of the issue. Simply stated, the level-of-analysis problem concerns the 
selection of an analytical 'frame' or perspective from which to undertake social 
research. In IR theory, this has generally involved the selection of individual-, state-, 
or system- level observations, in order to reveal causal relationships within the 
international political environment. However, the conceptual understanding of this 
selection has often diverged between the different theoretical perspectives within IR. 
As a result, the level-of-analysis problem has contributed to IR's continued failure to 
establish "some common frame of reference" (Singer 1961, 92). 
  
The impact of the level-of-analysis problem is clearly revealed in recent IR 
scholarship on the rise of China. Analyses and predictions based on China's meteoric 
economic rise have tended to engage with only one analytical perspective, that is, the 
system level-of-analysis. Simply defined, the system level-of-analysis refers to the 
observation of the organisation of the highest level of international actors, primarily 
states. However, embedded within this system are specific state structures, organised 
in differentiated ways, and managed by the actions of political office-holders. As a 
result, additional levels of analysis are required to properly understand and explain 
the nature of the foreign policy behaviour of states. 
 
In the specific context of the Sino-Australia relationship, the recent literature has 
identified Australia as uniquely placed in its diplomatic linkage with the U.S. and 
China (White 2011). Clearly situated within the Asia-Pacific region, Australia 
remains beyond the reach of China's immediate military projection, yet still heavily 
involved in its military alliance with the U.S. Furthermore, Australia stands to gain 
significant and prolonged economic prosperity should it maintain a strong economic 
relationship with China into the future. It is these considerations which inspire the 
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current study. As a consequence of this position, Australia's diplomatic relationship 
with China could potentially alter the relationship between China and the U.S., or at 
least, assist in the easing of tensions by acting as a diplomatic middle-man (White 
2005, 479). However, the relative size of Australia's economy and military strength 
assuredly exempt it from considerations at the global scale. Even if individual- or 
state-level variables can be shown to demonstrably alter the nature of international 
political outcomes, Australia would not automatically transcend to a point of causal 
significance for the entire international system. Rather, the nature of Australia's 
policy response to China will serve as an example for other countries seeking to 
manage their existing diplomatic relationships with their diplomatic response to 
China in the future. 
 
The potential significance of the level-of-analysis problem to Australia's strategic 
position in relation to China is clearly evident. At the system level, the rise of China 
represents a substantial change in the distribution of power within the international 
system. As a result, scholars have begun to question whether China will dramatically 
alter the 'rules of the game' of the international system, or simply become one of the 
key 'players' in a system which otherwise retains its existing features (White 2011).  
At the state level, the peaceful or antagonistic nature of China's rise is determined by 
the internal pressures facing each of the key actors (Buzan 2010, 14). For example, 
China may need to reconsolidate its authoritarian rule, through the evocation of an 
external threat, in order to quash internal dissent. Furthermore, the foreign policies of 
Australia and other western democracies could be altered by popular public will and 
perceptions. Finally, at the individual level, the diplomatic relationships between 
states, along with their international political consequences, are determined by the 
personality and perceptions of significance policy makers.  
 
This complexity, in attaining the most appropriate or pragmatic perspective of 
analysis, is largely characteristic of the key debates within the broader field of IR 
theory. Broadly speaking, IR paradigms can be divided between liberal, realist and 
constructivist accounts of the international system, further divided into a series of 
respective subcategories. Each theoretical paradigm employs its own specific 
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interpretation of the level-of-analysis problem, the variation of which underlies much 
of the debate between them. Thus, a particular understanding of the international 
environment is based equally on the level-of-analysis a theorist uses, as well as 
whether a theorist defines levels as interchangeable analytical categories or exclusive 
points of causal significance (Buzan 1995). In other words, levels can either be the 
result of categorising political phenomena for the sake of analytical simplicity, or as 
a fundamental feature of the international environment insofar as they represent the 
hierarchical order of significance.   
 
Despite utilising both system and state levels of analysis, the IR scholarship 
surrounding the rise of China has often left the individual level of analysis aside. 
Regrettably, the intellectual debate surrounding the issue tends to forgo the 
potentially crucial point of causal significance, the level of human decision makers. 
Aside from influence of particular analytical traditions embedded within IR, it is 
unclear why this should be the case. Since its formation in 1949, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has firmly consolidated its authoritarian rule over the 
Chinese populace. As a result, significant policy decisions and reforms have 
originated from a select group of individuals at the helm of the party (Weatherly 
2007, 7). Conversely, the character of the democratically elected Australian 
government tends to transform alongside changing public opinions, and particularly 
the public support for a particular leader. Evidently, and particularly in the case of 
Australia, the personality of leaders has some part to play in the policy direction of 
the state. 
 
In response, this study considers the impact of the role of individuals (specifically, 
Prime Ministers) on Australian foreign policy concerning China. This serves a 
number of purposes. First, the investigation provides a new perspective from which 
to understand Australia's foreign policy direction in the future. If the nature of 
Australia's foreign policy strategies can be convincingly linked to the personal 
influence of its leaders, the process of foreign policy formation can be further 
illuminated. For instance, the findings of the analysis will shed light on the way 
changes of government, through elections or leadership spills, affect Australia's 
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broader foreign policy approaches and strategic positioning. Second, the 
investigation will also shed light on the significance of an active engagement with 
the level-of-analysis problem in contemporary IR. As revealed in a review of the 
surrounding literature, the level-of-analysis problem is often poorly defined and 
understood, and as such, its solution is often taken for granted. 
 
While the study specifically investigates the individual-level of analysis, it does not 
presume particular individuals to be solely responsible for every aspect of an 
international political outcome. The level-of-analysis problem is itself embedded 
within a complex meta-theoretical debate concerning the relationship between 
'agents' and 'structures' (Wendt 1987, 338), and as such, this level of abstraction 
would essentially prove to be theoretically fruitless. However, the study does aim to 
measure the extent of the influence particular individuals have held over the certain 
foreign policy outcomes. Specifically, the study will measure the influence of 
individual personality traits of the past three Australian Prime Ministers, and its 
reflection in cooperative and/or antagonistic policies towards China. In this respect, 
cooperative policies and positions will consider those which result in cohesive 
international diplomacy between Australia and China. Conversely, antagonistic 
policies will consider both explicit statements against China, as well as any 
unintended negative consequences from domestic or foreign policies.  
 
In order facilitate this investigation, the study will utilise a qualitative multiple-case 
study approach in order to effectively engage with the interpretative nature of the 
variables (Yin 2009, 19). Each government administration contained within the 
study will be treated as a separate case study from which to establish a causal 
narrative concerning the Sino-Australian relationship. Consequently, the observed 
outcomes in this relationship will be compared and contrasted in order to highlight 
the significance of the individual level of analysis. The resource base for each of the 
case studies will rely primarily on the media coverage surrounding the Sino-





This thesis will argue that the personal influence of Howard, Rudd and Gillard 
clearly impacted upon Australia's relationship with China. While the systemic 
pressures of China's rise undoubtedly contributed to the overarching structure of 
Australia's foreign policy agenda, each leader demonstrably displayed significant 
agency in their personal interpretation and response to these systemic pressures. In 
reflection, the study argues that an inclusive conceptual understanding of the level-
of-analysis problem requires researchers to consider the causal interaction between 
variables at each of the analytical levels. As a result, future investigations of foreign 
policy responses to China's rise ought to be considered in light of the mutual 
interaction between the causal agency of individuals and the overarching systemic 
pressures. This would not only serve to clarify the various predictions of foreign 
policy outcomes, but also provide a coherent depiction of the future policy directions 
state leaders may choose to follow. 
  
The remainder of the study is divided into five parts. Chapter Two contains a review 
of the relevant literature surrounding the topic of the level-of-analysis debate, and its 
relation to IR scholarship on China's rise. Chapter Three looks at the Howard 
government’s time in office (1996 - 1997), where geostrategic and security issues 
primarily dominated the policy agenda concerning China, before eventually giving 
way to a cohesive diplomacy based on shared economic ties. Chapter Four examines 
the Rudd government’s years in office (2007 - 2010), which despite Rudd’s 
experience as a trained Sinologist and initial popularity within China, attracted a 
number of diplomatic tensions with the Chinese government. Chapter Five provides 
the final case study of the Gillard government (2010 - 2013), which saw Gillard 
successfully repair the Sino-Australian relationship, despite coming reluctantly to the 
international stage. Chapter Six provides a discussion of the overall findings, and 
offers a resolution to the research problem at hand. As the case studies will 
demonstrate, Australia's policy response to the systemic pressures of China's rise has 




II. Chapter Two: The Level-of-Analysis Problem in IR Theory 
 
The academic field of IR is often characterised as a "long tradition of Great Debates" 
(Lake 2013, 657). However, the complexity of international politics means that the 
disciplinary outcomes of these grand theoretical contests have, more often than not, 
proven inconclusive. Nevertheless, the fervently systematic process of attempting to 
prove or disprove these grand theories has left behind a particularly rich 
philosophical heritage. As a result, the research puzzle of the current study is situated 
within the central meta-theoretical debate underlying many of these grand theories: 
the level-of-analysis problem. This literature review attempts to identify and evaluate 
the understanding of this problem and its relationship to contemporary IR theory. 
The review can be divided into three parts. First, it provides an account of the origin 
of the level-of-analysis problem in IR literature. Second, it attempts to identify and 
evaluate the way the problem has been engaged within IR theory. Finally, the review 
concludes with a discussion of the significance of the debate for the comprehensive 
understanding of modern IR, specifically as it relates to the case of Australia's 
foreign policy direction towards China. 
 
The level-of-analysis problem refers to the theoretical selection of a 'level' of 
analytical observation prior to the undertaking of IR research. Generally, one of three 
potential levels is possible: the individual, the state or the system level. Each level of 
analysis reflects a particular kind of abstraction from reality, which is presented to be 
of more causal significance or utility than another. While claims of the comparative 
explanatory powers of each of these levels provide the basis for much of the 
surrounding debate, the very process of making the distinction in the first place is 
contested. As the literature reveals, much of the confusion surrounding the level-of-
analysis debate comes from the conflation or misinterpretation of certain key terms 
and concepts. As a result, contemporary IR attempts to 'solve' the level-of-analysis 
problem by falling back on familiar analytical frames, rather than engaging with the 




The popular depiction of the level-of-analysis problem in IR is generally considered 
to have originated from Kenneth Waltz's 1959 book Man, the State and War. While 
the book was not specifically envisioned as a depiction of a 'level-of-analysis' 
problem per se, Waltz's account of the nature of IR theory can be seen to have 
established the analytical perspective for the level-of-analysis debate which was to 
follow. Man, the State and War establishes an analytical framework based on three 
'images' of international relations, in order to coherently categorise the variety of 
explanations for war (Waltz 1959, 12). Each image of analysis describes one of three 
common perspectives within the broader field of IR, based primarily on their 
identification of the location of the causal element. Thus, according to Waltz, the 
study of the explanation for war can be divided into three distinct categories: those 
relating it to human nature; the domestic organisation of states; and, the character of 
the international system (Waltz 1959, 12). 
 
J. David Singer further developed on the concept of the level-of-analysis problem 
through a review of Waltz's previous work (1960), and his later essay, "The Level-
of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" (1961). Singer argues that the 
images of analysis identified by Waltz, in fact, result from a crucial preliminary 
conceptual choice made by IR researchers prior to study (1961, 90). As a result, the 
work of Singer directly establishes the level-of-analysis problem as a fundamental 
issue for the development of the field of IR. Furthermore, his contribution introduces 
an enduring analytical requirement of the level-of-analysis concept: that the 
investigation of one level of analysis categorically rules out the investigation of 
another (1961, 79). Accordingly, Singer finds that the continued reluctance of IR 
theorists to establish "some common frame of reference", or shared resolution to the 
level-of-analysis problem, risks hindering the continued growth of the field of IR 
(1961, 92). Without this shared understanding, the empirical research of various IR 
theories will continue to work at cross-purposes, as an assortment of "disparate, non-
comparable, and isolated bits of information or extremely low-level generalizations" 




Almost twenty years later, the massively influential contribution by Waltz in his 
1979 book, "Theory of International Politics", attempted to provide precisely this 
common frame of reference for the field of IR. "Theory of International Politics" 
develops upon Waltz earlier framework of analysis by distinguishing between the 
'systemic' third image of analysis, and the 'reductionist' first and second images 
(1979, Ch. 2-4). As a crucial aspect for the current context, Waltz asserts that 
structural/systemic accounts of the international political environment were the only 
appropriate perspective from which one could adequately explain international 
political phenomena (Waltz 1979, 79). According to Waltz, reductionist theories fail 
explain how "changes at the unit level produce less change of outcomes than one 
would expect in the absence of systemic restraints" (1979, 69). Therefore, 
individual-level and state-level explanations fail to meet the requirements of a theory 
of international politics in explaining and predicting political outcomes in a general 
sense (Waltz 197, 69), and are thus inherently incompatible with IR theory. Waltz's 
position here is should not be mistaken as an appeal to structural determinism 
(Buzan 1995, 212), but rather an explicit depiction of IR as a field of study. 
According to Waltz, and much of the IR scholarship which followed, the system 
level-of-analysis provides an unparalleled analytical perspective from which to 
explain the nature of international political outcomes in a consistent and scientific 
way.  
 
Despite the influence of Waltz's contributions, the contemporary understanding of 
the level-of-analysis problem has grown to reflect the innate complexity of the 
international environment, to which contemporary researchers feel compelled to 
respond to from an "eclectic [and] multi-causal position" (Buzan 1995, 200) (Sil and 
Katzenstein 2010). Lake (2013, 568), for instance, argues the merits of theoretical 
eclecticism, as the intersection between competing paradigms in IR, and commends 
the idea that theoretical verification ought to be paradigmatically grounded in 
'whatever works'. For Lake, the future success of IR as a field of inquiry requires the 
assimilation of the core theoretical concepts found within each of the opposing 
paradigms. However, this interpretation presents a significant challenge for any 
attempt to meaningfully engage with the underlying philosophical issues of the level-
of-analysis problem. Key contributors to the level-of-analysis debate have frequently 
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argued that the failure to systematically distinguish between the different analytical 
perspectives has consistently obstructed IR's growth as a theoretical field, and that it 
will continue to do so until it is appropriately resolved (Buzan 1995, 198; Singer 
1961, 92; Waltz 1970, 78; Wendt 1987, 338). Furthermore, the specific project of 
eclecticist theory draws upon researchers an even greater obligation to explicitly 
state their philosophical commitments (Cornut 2014, 14). This is to say, eclectic IR 
theory requires researchers to carefully specify the way in which they understand and 
respond to the level-of-analysis problem, in order to provide academic coherency. 
While the attempt by mainstream IR to contextualise the use of a particular level-of-
analysis in order to maintain theoretical malleability is understandable, without 
properly engaging with the underlying philosophical concerns, the academic pursuit 
risks losing out on a crucial point of insight. In response, the following section aims 
to explore these underlying philosophical concerns in greater detail, in order to 
further establish the key terms of the level-of-analysis debate.  
 
The contributions of the level-of-analysis debate often underlie much of the 
contention between each of the opposing schools of thought within IR, to the point 
where it has now become characteristic of the intellectual field (Coward 2006, 56). 
For example, the significant contributions of Waltz (1959; 1971) to the level-of-
analysis literature, and his feverish support for system-level explanations, clearly 
underline his position as a neorealist, and much of his characteristic assumptions of 
'power politics' which followed (Waltz 1990, 29). In turn, the example of neorealism 
is directly contrasted to analytical perspective of classical realism. According to 
classical realism theorists, such as Hans J. Morgenthau, the violent nature of the 
international system is a direct result of the selfish nature of human beings; clearly 
utilising an individual-level of analysis (Walt 1998, 31). Similarly, much of the work 
of liberal IR theorists is conceptualised in terms of the state-level of analysis (Walt 
1998, 32), which in turn, has significantly shaped the now pervasive liberal 
interdependence theories (Ikenberry 2011; Oneal et al. 1996). Finally, constructivist 
theorists, such as Alexander Wendt, have attempted to utilise both the system and 
state levels-of-analysis in their assertion that the identity of state actors, and world of 
norms in which the act, are "mutually constitutive" (Wendt 1995, 413). In light of 
this analytical disparity, the project of the level-of-analysis debate is now to establish 
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a common perspective from which to engage with the problem; a process somewhat 
muddied by a conflation of terms within the core literature.  
 
Nonetheless, a helpful distinction can be made in order to somewhat clarify the terms 
of the debate. In particular, Buzan (1995, 203) and Moul (1973, 495) have argued 
that the level-of-analysis problem can be separated into two philosophical modes of 
inquiry: ontological and epistemological. This distinction thus provides an accessible 
frame of reference from which to approach the level-of-analysis problem and the 
conceptual confusion which surrounds it. 
 
An ontological perspective of the level-of-analysis problem sees levels as particular 
units of analysis. In other words, levels are seen to represent physically real social 
aggregations, each organised hierarchically as constitutive of the next, and to which 
casual explanations may be attributed (Buzan 1995, 2004). From this perspective, the 
level-of-analysis problem is seen to be concerned with establishing the physical 
locations from which international outcomes can be seen to originate. Waltz's 
selection of humans, the state and the state system as the primary loci of 
international outcomes (1959, 12), as well as Singer's depiction of the state and 
system levels (1961, 89), are primary examples of this. In his review of the broader 
literature, Buzan provides a comprehensive list of the possible identities of these 
levels, ranging them hierarchically from: the Individual, the Bureaucracy, and the 
Unit (State) level; the Sub-system (Regional) level; and the System (international) 
level. The identification of these units of analysis enable researchers to position their 
study in the observation of a particular site at which political phenomena are 
primarily shaped and determined, and thus narrow the search for complex causal 
relationships to particular location. The identification of these units of analysis is 
largely self-evident, and should hardly be considered contentious. However, the 
confusion surrounding the level-of-analysis problem arises once the ontological 
attributes of these units are conflated to encompass particular explanations of 
outcomes in the international environment.  As a result, these explanations become 
overly simplified in order to be cohesive with the ontological assumptions of each 




Conversely, an epistemological perspective of the level-of-analysis problem sees 
levels as "types of variables that explain a particular unit's behaviour" (Moul 1973, 
495). In this sense, levels are considered to refer to the particular explanations 
attributed to actor behaviour. This distinction between units and the explanation of 
their behaviour does much to clarify the confusion surrounding the level-of-analysis 
problem. A primary example of this is provided by the causal significance that Waltz 
assigns to the structure of the international system. In actuality, a crucial distinction 
should be made here between the term system, which refers to the collective 
aggregation of states in the international environment, and structure, which refers to 
the underlying principle of their organisation. Waltz's central argument in "Theory of 
International Politics" (1979) essentially revolves around this interpretation of levels 
as sources of explanation, through the assertion that the structure of the state system 
(i.e. the "ordering principle" (p. 88), the "character of units" (p. 93), and, the 
"distribution of capabilities" (p. 97) of the system) provides the sole basis for any 
serious attempt to theorise 'international political outcomes'. In doing so, Waltz takes 
these structural causes to be constitutive of the international system, and so 
simultaneously refers to both the ontological and epistemological aspects of the 
level-of-analysis problem.  
 
The conflation of terms surrounding the philosophical concepts of units and 
explanations risks stifling the critical utility of the level-of-analysis problem. 
According to Buzan, (1995, 201-12), clearly making the distinction between the 
ontological and epistemological perspectives provides an analytical means to 
systematically cross-reference the units-of-analysis in IR theory with the sources of 
explanation of the behaviour. 
 
Despite the clarity that a refinement of concepts can provide, the fundamental 
difficulty of the level-of-analysis problem still resides in the process of abstracting 
meaning from a complex reality in a practical and meaningful way. Thus, once 
considered in light of the analogous philosophical dilemma of the agent-structure 
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problem, the preliminary conceptual choice of the unit of analysis is significantly 
obscured. According to Alexander Wendt, the agent-structure problem in IR regards 
the fact that the "purposeful" nature of human beings (agents) constitutes a society 
(structure) within which all interaction is contained, and which in turn shapes the 
character of these interactions (1987, 338). Thus, Wendt concludes, that "human 
agents and social structure are, in one way or another, theoretically interdependent or 
mutually implicating entities" (1987, 338), and in consequence, IR theories must 
explicitly state how this interdependence or mutual implication is manifested in the 
international environment. However, in order to avoid the tortuous language of 
'mutual implications' and 'structurationism', this problem can be framed in much 
simpler terms. Putnam (1988) provides one such example of this through his 
application of game theory to the investigation of international negotiations. 
According to Putnam, negotiators must participate simultaneously at the two levels – 
or 'games'– of international and national negotiations in order to both "satisfy 
domestic pressures", and minimise any undesirable" foreign developments" (1988, 
434). Similarly, in a later contribution, Jervis provides an account of the systems 
effect whereby political outcomes are determined by the interconnection and 
interaction of systemic and domestic variables in the political environment (2012, 
411). Thus, the nature of the response to a structural stimulus at the international 
level presumably relies on the political structure of the states involved. In this respect, 
Waltz's concept of an analytically abstracted 'systemic' theory fails to regard, in any 
substantial detail, the nature of the relationship between the different levels of 
analysis and the system by which they are contained. Despite acknowledging the 
theoretical necessity of investigations into unit-level causes (Waltz 1979, 48-49), 
Waltz distinguishes between his systemic theory of IR, and the relative theoretical 
inadequacy of reductionist theories (79). Justified by the understanding of theory as 
the necessary abstraction from an otherwise complex reality, the utility of which is 
provided by its "explanatory and predictive powers" (1979, 8), Waltz's position here 
unnecessarily sacrifices conceptual richness for theoretical simplicity. This, in turn, 
diminishes both the depth of explanation and adaptability of predictions available 




As demonstrated, the level-of-analysis debate clearly underlines much of the 
theoretical abstractions to be made concerning the nature of the international 
environment. In the current context, the economic rise of China provides a perfectly 
adequate point of departure from which to judge the relative causal significance of 
the different levels of analysis. Following China's historic economic growth, IR 
literature has increasingly reflected a growing sense of insecurity concerning the 
prospects of renewed conflict between the global great powers (US and China), and 
regionally, between China and its neighbouring countries. Simply defined, the 
academic reaction to this international situation has been broadly divided between 
realist and liberal paradigms. In general, realist interpretations have often focused on 
the inevitability of conflict between great powers, as a condition of the structural 
arrangements of states (e.g. Mearsheimer 2006). Thus, states in an anarchical system 
are placed in a position of perpetual insecurity, whereby the only means of protecting 
themselves is to compete for a military advantage, thus increasing the potential for 
conflict. Conversely, liberals have argued that China's engagement with the global 
financial system has attracted considerable economic benefits, thus pacifying China 
in the process (e.g. Ikenberry 2008). Evidently, a substantial portion of this academic 
response has been committed to a systemic level-of-analysis, albeit with markedly 
distinct interpretations of the system. 
 
Within the frame of this discussion, Australia has emerged as a potentially 
significant element in the maintenance of future relations between China and the 
United States, and the Asian region in general. For example, Hugh White (2005; 
2010; 2011) has consistently argued that is imperative that Australia use its 
diplomacy with China as a leverage point to convince the United States to work with 
China in developing a 'concert of power' in Asia. The significance that White, and 
others, have placed on the Australian political leadership in managing this 
relationship (2011, 83; Beeson 2011, 574-75; Gyngell 2008, 5), privileges the notion 
that the actions of individuals could influence international outcomes. However, due 
to a firmly held and problematic commitment to a system oriented response to the 
level-of-analysis problem, the grand systemic theories in IR have often been hesitant 
to incorporate the agency of the individual into their analysis (Byman and Pollack 
2001, 145-146). Furthermore, the attempts to empirically research the processes 
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behind the decisions of these key actors (Hermann 1975, 2001; Hermann and Kegley 
1995; Geva and Mintz 1997; Egeberg 1999; Mintz 2004; Jervis 2013) have been 
regrettably inward looking. In other words, research into the behaviour of policy 
makers has often provided an in-depth account of the personal motivations behind 
individual behaviours, without reflecting on the systemic environment. Consequently, 
the prospect for a comprehensive analysis of China's rise has been continually 
restrained by the refusal, by each side of the debate, to consider variables outside 
their specific frame of reference. 
 
To conclude, the failure of IR theory to consider the agency of individuals has left 
the field with a fundamental conceptual difficulty, thus undermining its explanatory 
power. Largely as a consequence of Waltz's hugely influential contributions, much 
of contemporary IR has relied on the casual selection of analytical levels. Thus, IR 
scholars have tended to evade the philosophical complexity contained within the 
problem. However, in doing so, mainstream IR theory risks losing out on a vast 
analytical resource. The conceptual integration of levels as units-of-analysis, and 
level as sources of explanation, has obscured the findings of IR research to the point 
where greater causal significance is assigned to the system level-of-analysis, simply 
as a measure of its size. Furthermore, once considered in light of the necessity of 
even basic interaction between political variables, the separation of the levels 
appears harder to maintain, even for analytical purposes. Despite its apparent 
conceptual complexity, the level-of-analysis problem is not entirely intractable. Put 
simply, the problem can be understood as two distinct inquiries: 1) what the levels 
refer to; and, 2) how the levels relate to each other. Once levels have been 
distinguished between 'units' and 'sources of explanation', the level-of-analysis 
problem becomes a matter of revealing the relationship between these levels. 
 
The proceeding chapters will attempt to apply this conceptual understanding of the 
level-of-analysis problem to the empirical investigation of the Howard, Rudd and 
Gillard governments. Accordingly, the analysis will consider Australia's foreign 
policy response to a rising China in terms of explanations provided by the system, 
the state, and the individual levels-of-analysis. Each of these explanations of 
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behaviour will thus be compared in terms of their relative causal significance, as well 
as their interaction with each of the other constitutive causes or forces. Informed by 
the preceding conclusions, this analysis will construct the relationship between 
system-level explanations, and state- and individual- level explanations as 
constitutive parts of an overarching causal relationship. As a result, the theoretical 
validity of each explanation will be determined, not on the ontological attributes of 
their analytical level, but on the extent of their contribution to the causal relationship.
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III. Chapter Three: The Howard Government (1996 - 2007) 
 
Introduction 
The Howard government's eleven years in office witnessed substantial changes in the 
Sino-Australian relationship. As it became clear that China's economic growth rates 
would continue to burgeon throughout the 1990's, the Australian government became 
increasingly perceptive to the potential of influence of China's rise, both 
economically and militarily. Thus, the Howard government's foreign policy direction 
seemed poised between their long standing alliance with the United States and a 
burgeoning economic relationship with a rising China. As a result, despite the 
sustained and harmonious development of economic relations between the countries, 
security concerns continued to hinder the relationship throughout the early years of 
the administration's time in office. However, following the events of the September 
11 terrorist attacks in 2001, these tensions largely dissipated.  
 
 In order to address the underlying research question of the study, this chapter 
provides an empirical investigation of the direction of the Howard government's 
foreign policy towards China during this period. Specifically, in order to determine 
the causal significance of the individual level-of-analysis on these foreign policy 
outcomes, the chapter looks explicitly to separate the influence of Australian Prime 
Minister, John Howard, from system-level or state-level explanations. The first part 
of this chapter provides an account of the underlying political dynamics and 
commitments of the Howard administration, as well the personal attributes of 
Howard, individually. The chapter then divides into the three core aspects of the 
Sino-Australian relationship: the economic and trade relationship; the Australian 
response to Chinese domestic insecurities; and, the strategic and security concerns. 
As a result, the examination of these aspects assists the study in highlighting the 
repeated incidence of two causal dynamics at play in the Howard government's 
foreign policy towards China: system-level and individual-level causes. As detailed 
in the proceeding analysis, the case aspects of the Howard government's relationship 
with China suggest that Howard's personal attributes, as well as character of his 
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regime, were critical in the determination of the nature of the Australian policy 
response to China.  
 
The Howard government's first term commenced with a landslide victory over the 
Australian Labour Party (ALP). Throughout the lead up to the election, Howard 
repeatedly refused to provide any detailed policy proposals (Hewett 1996). However, 
in the weeks immediately prior to the election, Howard's policy platform was 
revealed to be largely in keeping with the Coalition party's social and economic 
conservatism.. Furthermore, the release of the Howard government's pre-election 
foreign policy document, A Confident Australia, effectively distanced itself from the 
Keating government's emphasis on Australia's international future. The policy 
document, while largely downplayed in the overall election campaign, reoriented 
Australia's multilateral approach to foreign affairs to a renewed focus on its bilateral 
relationships (Brown 1996, 331-2). Here, the document notably argued that 
"relations with Asian and the United States were not […] mutually exclusive" 
(Brown 1996, 332). However, the scope of this commitment to foreign affairs could 
be considered questionable in light of Howard's announcement of significant cuts to 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) over three years (Dodson 
1996). 
 
Within the first few months in power, the Howard government was forced to deal 
with a number of diplomatic issues with the Chinese government. First arising in the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis of March 1996, the diplomatic tension between Australia and 
China continued to escalate throughout the rest of the year (Wesley 2000, 57). In 
June, the Howard government's cancellation of its Development Import Finance 
Facility (DIFF) aid program, which it considered to be "too expensive and not very 
useful to the recipient countries" (Brown 1996, 337), led Chinese Minster for Trade 
Wu Yi to express "strong concern" over Australia's decision (Wesley 2000, 57). In 
July, Australia's concerns for 'post-handover' Hong Kong and China's nuclear test 
angered China further (Wesley 2000, 57). In August, China criticised the 
strengthening of the Australia-U.S. alliance and a visit by Australian Primary 
Industries Minister, John Anderson, to Taiwan (Wesley 2000, 57). Finally, in 
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September, Howard met with the Dalai Lama in spite of threats by Chinese officials 
that it would damage their economic relationship (MacNicholl and Greenlees 1996). 
The combination these incidents eventually culminated in the one of the lowest 
points in the Sino-Australia relationship since the 1970s. However, in response to 
this failure of diplomacy, the Howard government moved to establish a detailed 
policy framework surroundings its approach to the Sino-Australian bilateral 
relationship (Wesley 2000, 58). Presumably as a result of this increased 
consideration, the Sino-Australian relationship steadily improved over the remainder 
of Howard's term in government.  
 
Economic Relationship 
The stable rise of the Sino-Australian economic relationship can be seen to be all the 
more impressive considering the tumultuous foreign policy environment it developed 
in. Since the start of the Howard government's time in office China transitioned from 
Australia's fifth largest trading partner (with $8 billion in two-way trade)(McLennan 
1996, 42) to Australia's second largest trading partner in 2006 (with $50 billion in 
two-way trade)(Pink 2008, 144). The success of this relationship, rested largely on 
the significant economic complementarities between Australia and China. China's 
economic rise has drawn with it a dramatic increase in its demand for energy and 
mineral resources, found in abundance in a geographically proximate Australia. 
Furthermore, the growing wealth of the country has contributed to an emerging 
middle-class, increasing Chinese demand for high-quality Australian agricultural 
imports and tertiary education. However, the potential significance of the Sino-
Australian economic relationship to the domestic economy during Howard's term 
was far greater for Australia than China. As a result, for the duration of the Howard 
government's time in office, the onus remained on Australia to improve the 
"competitive position of [it's] energy and mining sectors" and achieve a "stable 
political relationship between the two countries" (Zhang & Zheng 2008, 104). 
 
Following the tumultuous first years in government, the Howard government's 
foreign policy towards China increasingly reflected its awareness of the significance 
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of the economic dimensions of the relationship. For example, in the 1997 Foreign 
and Trade Policy White Paper, the Howard government emphasised the critical 
importance of China to Australia's economic prosperity, presenting a diplomatic 
strategy based on "mutual interest and mutual respect" (DFAT 1997, 63). 
Notwithstanding disruptions from the Sino-US disputes, this position of mutual 
respect remained largely stable throughout the Howard term in government. 
Furthermore, even despite the occurrence of these disputes, China's diplomatic 
response failed to elicit any negative economic consequences.  
 
A number of economic negotiations shaped the Sino-Australian relationship 
throughout the Howard government. Following the (temporary) souring of Sino-
Australian relations in 1996, an embittered Chinese government made a number of 
threats of economic retaliation against the Howard government (Skehan & Lague 
1996). However, as the Howard government became more accustomed to dealing 
with the rising power, these threats of economic coercion essentially disappeared. In 
May 2002, Howard personally travelled to China and succeeding in winning the bid 
for a $25 billion contract to supply liquefied natural gas to the Chinese market 
(Australian Associated Press 2002a, 2002c). Perhaps conveniently, this trip to China 
coincided with the Dalai Lama's second visit to Australia, to which Howard 
acknowledged Chinese officials were sensitive (Australian Associated Press 2002c) 
In May 2005, the Howard government commenced negotiations of an Australia-
China Free Trade Agreement, "making Australia only the second developed country, 
after New Zealand, to begin an FTA with China "(Zhang 2007, 104). 
 
Response to Chinese Domestic Insecurities 
From the beginning of its term, the Howard government struggled in its handling of 
key Chinese domestic insecurities, particular those surrounding the One China 
Policy. However, as his time in office progressed, Howard's handling of this tension 
gradually progressed to a far more nuanced style of diplomacy. In September 1996, 
the Dalia Lama was granted an official meeting with Howard, despite threats from 
the Chinese foreign ministry that it would "unavoidably influence" the Sino-
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Australian relationship (Dodson & Callick 1996). In response, Howard claimed that 
"no self-respecting Prime Minister of this country will ever bow to that kind of 
threat" and that "upholding … the principles [of Australia]" was more important than 
the possibility of future commercial difficulties (Dodson & Callick 1996). However, 
upon revisiting Australia in May 2002, the Dalai Lama was unable to meet with any 
government ministers, in a presumed attempt to avoid antagonising the Chinese prior 
to the negotiation of LNG contract (Zhang 2007, 99).  
 
More significantly, the Howard government's reaction to the Taiwan Strait Crisis 
represented a severe antagonism towards China. In March 1996, the newly elected 
Howard government urged Beijing to show restraint in its attempt to intimidate 
Taiwan through a number of naval military exercises shortly preceding the 
Taiwanese presidential election (Lague 1996). As military tensions between China 
and Taiwan continued to escalate, the United States military responded with the 
mobilisation its naval forces to the Taiwan Strait. Consequently, Australia was 
eventually drawn by Sino-US rhetoric to show its support for the US decision. As a 
result of this display of loyalty, Australia’s relationship with China suffered. 
According to many sources, Howard made a number of mistakes in his dealing with 
the Taiwan Strait Crisis. For example, it has been argued that the Australian 
government ought to have remained neutral throughout the crisis. It was only 
through provocation by the US military that the Howard government responded with 
a show of support for US military action. The comments suggest that Australia 
miscalculated the limits of the rhetoric surrounding the crisis, and unnecessarily 
jumped on board (Kilintworth 1996). Later, in his memoirs, Howard conceded that 
the tension resulted from misguided diplomacy, stating that "quite properly, we 
supported the Clinton Administration's position, but did it in a way which 
exacerbated Chinese sensitivities" (Dobell 2010). 
 
These tensions surrounding the issue of Taiwan continued to simmer throughout the 
Howard government's time in office. For example, in 2001 the Howard government 
expressed support for the US president George Bush's confrontational comments on 
Taiwan. This elicited a dramatic response from the Chinese government (Australian 
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Associated Press 2001). On 17 April 2001, tensions rose once more as three Royal 
Australian Navy vessels were challenged inside Chinese territorial waters 
(McSweeny & Atkins 2001). However, this time around the Howard government 
made a conscious effort to downplay the tensions, despite further provocation from 
the US military. 
 
In addition to the One China Policy, the vast disparity in interests and political 
differences between China and Australia allowed for a number of significant 
diplomatic disagreements, particularly in relation to human rights issues. However, 
Howard's attempt to downplay these issues, in the interest of further developing 
economic ties with China, for the most part allowed the government to avoid these 
tensions. For example, in 1997, the Howard government reversed the Australian 
policy of "publicly condemning human rights abuses in China" and instead 
established the annual Australia-China Human Rights Dialogue (Malik 2001, 124). 
The human rights dialogue came as a substitution of a United Nations resolution 
criticising China's human rights record, deemed by Downer to be "not terribly 
valuable" (Barker 1997). Intended to stabilise the Sino-Australian relationship, the 
Howard government's decision to hold private rather than public talks over human 
rights abuses drew harsh criticism from human rights groups following continued 
large scale arrests and religious oppression. Furthermore, in 2003 three Chinese 
dissidents were forcibly removed from the public gallery at the request of Chinese 
officials (Lewis 2003). Similarly, prominent critics of China's human rights record, 
Senator Bob Brown and Senator Kerry Nettle, were disallowed from entering the 
Parliamentary Chamber, so as to avoid their disruption of Hu's speech (Woolford 
2003). 
 
Despite the Howard's government's attempt at avoiding these tensions, a number of 
high profile cases emerged. First, Australian protesters of the banned Falun Gong 
movement were requested by the Chinese foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, to be 
removed from outside the Chinese Embassy in Canberra (Price 2003). Later, in June 
2005 Chen Yonglin defected from his position as first secretary for political affairs 
in the Chinese Consulate-general in Sydney (Zhang 2007, 100). While initially 
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hesitant to provide political asylum, public pressure eventually led the Australian 
government to provide a temporary protection visa (Kelton 2006, 230-231). The case 
was argued by a number of commentators to reflect the Howard government's 
intention to put humanitarian concerns above economic concerns, a charge which 
Howard quickly denied (Australian Broadcasting Commission 2005a). In response 
to the crisis, Howard later claimed that the Sino-Australia relationship was "mature 




The Howard government's trouble during the Taiwan Strait Crisis is reflective of the 
tension surrounding the Australia-U.S. alliance and Australia's relationship with 
China. Despite various attempts to reinterpret the ANZUS treaty otherwise 
(Australian Associated Press 2004), statements by US officials assured Howard that 
Australia's alliance with the U.S. would necessitate its participation in any military 
conflict with China (Kerin 2004).. As a result, the long standing military alliance 
between the United States and Australia reoccurred as a frequent point of tension 
between Australia and China. Despite constant attempts by the Howard government 
to downplay this tension (Barker 1996; Hartcher 1996; Sales 2005), Sino-U.S. 
confrontation directly resulted in tense relations between Australia and China. 
Furthermore, Howard's attempts to "re-invigorate" Australia's security alliance with 
the US was seen by China as a conscious attempt to contain the rising power 
(Australian Financial Review 2 Apr. 1997). In August 2001, this was further 
exacerbated when China issued a condemnation of the Howard government's role in 
the United States' attempt to increase security ties between key allies in the Asia-
Pacific region (Dwyer 2001). 
 
Despite the seemingly unavoidable nature of the tension surrounding the Australia-
U.S. alliance, the later years of the Howard government saw a conscious effort to 
downplay the influence of the alliance on its foreign policy. Following a collision 
between a US spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet in April 2001, the Howard 
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government stood resolutely to the side rather than participate in the growing stand 
of between China and the U.S. (Polgaze 2001). Later that year, the influence of the 
Australia-U.S. alliance underwent a significant change. Despite Howard's definitive 
military commitment to the U.S. following the September 11 attacks in New York, 
the usual display of Chinese outrage was markedly reduced (Barker 2002). 
Seemingly, as the bilateral relationship between Australia and China improved, 
tensions surrounding the alliance were more capably dismissed.  
 
A number of regional and international events during the Howard government's time 
in office significantly shaped Australia's diplomatic relationship with China. 
Regionally, Howard received the surprising support of China when it commenced 
the intervention in East Timor (Callick 1999). Despite the risk of tension emerging 
out of the geostrategic pressure of Australian action in East Timor, and the potential 
similarity between the Indonesian occupation of East Timor and China's role in Tibet 
(Cotton 2004, 57), the Chinese government still pledged its support. The underlying 
strategy behind China's decision is largely left to speculation. However, it should be 
noted that the Australian-led intervention in East Timor shortly led to the Indonesia's 
cancellation of the 1995 Australia-Indonesia security agreement, which China had 
publicly proclaimed as a containment policy (Cotton 2004, 57). 
 
Internationally, the Sino-Australian relationship warmed considerably following the 
September 11 attacks in New York. The terrorist attacks in New York saw the US 
commit to a global war on terror, a cause that Howard signed onto whole heartedly. 
However, the refocus of US military attention away from the Asia-Pacific 
presumably allowed a relieved China to ease tensions with the US and its allies, in 
order to receive some growing space. Consequently, Chinese support for Australian 
and US initiatives increased tenfold (Zhang 2007, 120). Furthermore, the overall 
tone of the diplomatic relationship between Australia and China was altered to a 
broadly more cooperative one. Significantly, US identification of China shifted from 
that of a "strategic competitor" to the search for a "constructive, cooperative, and 
candid relationship" (Glaser 2002, 224). Similarly, the Chinese reaction to 
Australia's closer relations with the United States were considerably restrained post-
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September 11, including Australia's announced participation in the missile system 
and closer security dialogue with the USA and Japan (Zhang 2007, 120). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined and explored the significant aspects of the Howard 
government's foreign policy towards China, as well as the effect it had on the Sino-
Australian diplomatic relationship. Overall, the Howard government's eleven years 
in office oversaw the harmonious and stable development of Sino-Australian 
economic ties, overcoming the considerable security tensions evident in the first 
years in government. As outlined in the case examples provided, significant aspects 
of this cooperation were facilitated by the changing diplomatic style of Howard. This 
can be reflected in Howard's behaviour during his later terms, including his decision 
to not meet the Dalai Lama a second time and to shy away from speaking out 
publicly against Chinese aggression or alleged human rights abuses. At the same 
time though, as the economic relationship progressed, the Chinese reaction to 
Australia's support of the Australia-U.S. alliance and other policy antagonisms 
seemed to diminish.  
 
As a result, neither the individual -level or system-level of causal explanations 
during the Howard administrations time in office appears to have been predominant. 
Instead, the presence of both levels of causal phenomena appeared to be irrevocably 
linked, in diplomatic situations akin to Putnam's two-level game. In other words, 
Howard's attempts to further Australia's economic engagement with a rapidly 
growing China were initially hindered by a number of reckless diplomatic moves and 
announcements, as well as Howard's insistence of the vital importance of the 
Australia-U.S. alliance. However, the eventual evolution of this diplomatic 




IV. Chapter Four: The Rudd Government (2007 - 2010) 
 
Introduction 
Despite the relative brevity of its term, as compared to its predecessor's, the Rudd 
government's time in office marked a significant turning point in the Sino-Australian 
relationship. Inheriting the substantial economic relationship with China, as 
developed by Howard, the election of the Rudd government drew with it a wave of 
excitement concerning China. As a trained Sinologist with the ability to speak fluent 
Mandarin, Kevin Rudd was expected to personally significantly strengthen 
Australia's diplomatic relationship with China. However, as the Rudd government's 
term progressed it became clear that Rudd was highly suspicious of the inevitable 
nature of the Chinese rise, thus drawing tension between the two countries. Although 
economic and security ties between China and Australia continued to progress, 
numerous tensions continued to arise throughout the Rudd government's term in 
office.  
 
 As with the previous chapter, the following case analysis provides an empirical 
account of the Rudd government's foreign policy towards China. In order to discern 
the validity of individual-level explanations for changes in the nature of the Sino-
Australian relationship during this time, the case study examines the policy decisions 
and diplomatic behaviour of Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd. In keeping with 
the conceptual frame of the overall study, this chapter attempts to distinguish the 
relationship between these individual-level influences from system-level and state-
level explanations. The chapter is once again divided into four parts. First, the 
chapter describes the political attributes of the Rudd government, and more 
specifically, the personal attributes of Rudd. The chapter then examines the three 
core aspects of the Sino-Australian relationship: the economic and trade relationship; 
the Australian response to Chinese domestic insecurities; and, Australia's strategic 
concerns and security ties. In doing so, the proceeding analysis finds that tension 
within the diplomatic relationship with China under Rudd was largely the result of 




The Rudd government was elected on the 3rd of December 2007, with an 83 seat 
majority in the House of Representatives. The Rudd government defeated and 
unseated John Howard; one of Australia's longest serving prime ministers, with a 
campaign focusing on 'new leadership' and the catchy campaign slogan "Kevin 07". 
Heavily focused on social equity, the Kevin '07 campaign promised a number of 
reforms including the "abolition of Work Choices, education for the future, and 
hospital management changes" (Barker 2007). Taken at odds with the Coalition's 
socially conservative party platform, these reforms followed the Labor Party's core 
ideological beliefs in presuming that "cohesion and growth, and equity and 
efficiency, can be mutually reinforcing"(Barker 2007). In effect, these ideological 
commitments to socially democratic ideals, with the help of Rudd's foreign policy 
background, largely translated into a foreign policy platform emphasising the need 
for international multilateralism. However, towards the end of the Rudd 
government's term, this "liberal internationalist" approach to foreign policy shifted 
into a "gritty realism", viewing Australia's isolation and the overall stability of the 
global environment with pessimistic apprehension (Griffiths 2010, 621). 
 
As evidenced by the campaign slogan, Rudd personally featured as the primary focal 
point of the election campaign. Born in 1957, Rudd was the "first Australian Prime 
Minister born after the Second World War" and "whose views were defined by the 
idea of the rise of China" (Gyngell 2008). Rudd graduated from the Australian 
National University in 1981 "with first class honours for his thesis on Chinese 
dissident, and democracy campaigner, Wei Jingsheng" (Kevin Rudd, n.d.). Rudd held 
the position of Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs from 22 November 2001, before 
becoming the Leader of the Opposition in 2006 (Kevin Rudd, n.d.). Clearly engaged 
with the impact of China on the region and the world, the election of Rudd as 
Australian Prime Minister afforded the government high expectations of the future of 
the Sino-Australian relationship. Furthermore, as the first Mandarin-speaking leader 
of a Western nation, Rudd's election elicited a "small wave of excitement in the 




However, Rudd's diplomatic finesse was eventually shrouded in doubt following the 
emergence of numerous reports of his confrontational personality behind closed 
doors (Australian Associated Press 2009c; Australian Broadcasting Commission 
2010a; Norington 2009). A further glimpse into Rudd's diplomatic style was later 
provided by the revelatory 'Wikileaks' leaked cable messages from the U.S. embassy, 
which highlighted U.S. officials' perceptions of Rudd as "self-serving" and a "control 
freak" (Hundt 2011, 276-7; Kitney 2010) During his time as leader, Rudd had 
centralised all policy decision making in the Prime Minister's Office, leading to 
accusations of an autocratic style of governance (Kefford 2013, 137-8). This, 
coupled with a number of domestic policy failures and unfavourable media coverage, 
contributed to Rudd's waning popularity and eventual dismissal as Prime Minister by 
his own party (Cassidy 2010). 
 
Economic Relationship 
Rudd came into office during a high point in the economic relationship between 
Australia and China. For the previous decade, trade between the two countries had 
risen exponentially, supported by the still persisting mining boom. The significance 
of the relationship was consistently present in Rudd's policy commitments, 
particularly in his pledged to make Australia "the most Asia-literate nation" in the 
western world (Kirby 2008).  As reflected in the bilateral strategic dialogue in 2008, 
the two economies were seen to be "very complimentary", especially in terms of 
"minerals and petroleum resources", as well as education and financial services 
(Smith and Yang 2008). Throughout the entirety of the Rudd government's time in 
office, China remained Australia's single largest trading partner (Australian 
Associated Press 2007). The economic significance of this relationship was properly 
revealed during the Global Financial Crisis. In 2009, despite experiencing an 11.6% 
decrease in total merchandise trade, Australia's two-way trade with China increased 
15.6% to reach a record of $78.1 billion (Priestly 2010, 82). Furthermore, Australia-
China investment continued to increase during this time, despite significant market 
instability (Priestly 2010, 83). In the year following, a 2010 Australian treasury 
document reflected that Australia has "largely avoided the business failures and 
large-scale employment losses that have occurred in many other countries", and that 
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this was largely underpinned by their "close trade links to … China" (Swan & 
Tanner 2010). Despite claims at the time that Australia had become 'hostage' to the 
Chinese economy, these strong economic links reflected a growing mutual 
dependence between the two countries (Zhang 2007, 84). 
 
Economic successes aside, the Rudd government's economic relationship with China 
was not without incident. Domestically, growing Chinese investment in Australian 
mining companies was increasingly leading to fears of Chinese control of Australian 
resources (Hoy 2008). The public concerns here primarily focused on the character 
and intentions of Chinese firms as state-owned entities, rather than the traditional 
privately owned investors (Fels & Brenchly 2008). In response, the Rudd 
government outlined a set of investment guidelines to scrutinise investments by 
foreign government-controlled entities which did not "operate solely in accordance 
with commercial considerations, and may instead pursue broader political or 
strategic objectives that could be contrary to Australia's national interest" (Firth 
2008). These guidelines eventually culminated in the rejection on an initial bid by 
the Chinese state-owned Minmetals, presumably on the grounds of its threat to 
national security due to its proximity to a missile testing range (Winestock 2009). 
However, it should be noted that while this response appeared to reflect a strategic 
protection of Australia's national interests, broader economic considerations may 
have been at play. In fact, the nature of Australia's response, in applying fairly 
restrained guidelines for potential investors, has been demonstrated to be largely 
consistent with an liberal economic ideology, rather than 'resource nationalism' 
(Wilson 2011, 300). As a result, it is likely that this issue emerged from state-level 
considerations of economic prosperity, rather than Rudd's personal convictions 
concerning Chinese investment. 
 
Response to Chinese Domestic Insecurities 
Throughout the Rudd government's years in office, the same Chinese domestic 
insecurities remained reasonably constant. Just as with Howard, the Rudd 
government struggled to consolidate a growing bilateral relationship with China with 
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significant international concerns with its expansive territorial claims. Furthermore, 
human rights concerns in Tibet, as well as China broadly, still persisted as a sensitive 
diplomatic issue. However, in April 2008, during his first official visit to China as 
Prime Minister, Rudd demonstrated a surprisingly balanced diplomatic approach to 
this tension with China. In the months leading up to Rudd's visit, China's violent 
crackdown on riots in Tibet lead to calls by Western governments to boycott the 
upcoming Beijing Olympics (Australian Broadcasting Commission 2008). In a 
surprising move, Rudd referred to these "significant human rights problems in Tibet" 
during a speech delivered in entirely mandarin at Peking University (Rudd 2008). 
However, expressed under the guise of the 'frank' dialogue of a 'true friendship', 
Rudd's comments went on to support continued world engagement through the 
Olympic Games (Rudd 2008). As a result, the Chinese state-media was able to 
selectively focus on Rudd's support for the Olympic Games, while Rudd garnered 
domestic support in Australia (Australian Financial Review 14 Apr. 2008). Thus, the 
competence demonstrated in Rudd's diplomatic response to this tension, was possible 
precisely due to his intimate understanding of the nature Chinese sensitivities.  
 
However, despite this intimate knowledge of China's domestic insecurity, a number 
of human rights issues still managed to draw tensions between the Rudd government 
and China. In July 2009, Chinese-Born Australian National Stern Hu, the head of 
Rio Tinto's operations in China, was arrested in Shanghai on allegations of espionage 
and stealing state secrets (McDonell 2009). Conspicuously, the arrest occurred 
during increasingly hostile iron ore price negotiations between Australian China and 
shortly following the collapse of a deal between Chinese state-owned mining 
company, Chinalco, and Rio Tinto (Rodgers 2009). In response to the allegations, 
deemed "completely ridiculous, and completely political" (Sheridan 2009) by 
Australian media, Rudd publicly warned that "China too has significant economic 
interests at stake in its relationship with Australia and with its other commercial 
partners around the world" (Rodgers 2009). However, this and various others 
diplomatic efforts by Foreign Minister Stephen Smith (Australian Broadcasting 
Commission 2009b) were eventually proven ineffectual and Hu was sentenced to ten 




 The Rudd government's surprising decision to grant a visa to Chinese exile Rebiya 
Kadeer in August 2009 further antagonised the Sino-Australian relationship. Kadeer, 
accused by the Chinese government as a terrorist, and mastermind behind the recent 
deadly riots in Chinese city, Urumqi, publicly campaigned against human rights 
abuses in China while in Australia (MacBean 2009). Clearly outraged by the incident, 
the Chinese government cancelled a number of diplomatic visits between the 
countries(Australian Broadcasting Commission 2009a) and published an article in 
the state-media accusing Australia of making itself "the champion leader of an anti-
China chorus" (Australian Associated Press 2009d). For this reason, the Rudd 
government's decision to grant the visa, amidst FTA negotiations and increasing 
levels of economic interdependence, is particularly striking. In defence of the 
decision, Rudd remarked on the Chinese government's "determination to play 
domestic politics" with the Sino-Australian relationship and influence Australia's 
internal affairs (Australian Associated Press 2009e). As a result, the seemingly 
misguided nature of this antagonistic policy is clearly indicative of Rudd's personal 
influence over Australia's policy response to China.  
 
Defence Policy 
Despite the absence of any major conflicts in the Asian region during the time, the 
Rudd government's defence policy towards China took a markedly wary tone, 
compared to that of his predecessor. Internationally, the strategic climate had shifted 
significantly from that found during the Howard years. The United States 
commitment to the global War on Terror had lost much of its steam, and had been 
followed up by the newly elected U.S. President Barrack Obama's 'pivot' to Asia, a 
move Australia would mirror. 
 
Rudd's strategic relationship with China started strong, when in February 2008 Smith 
participated in the first Australia-China bilateral strategic dialogue with Chinese 
Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi. The results were positive, with Smith's post-dialogue 
reflections indicating that the Australia-China relationship was "very, very strong 
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and productive" (Smith & Yang 2008). Furthermore, Smith emphasised that the 
Australian government did not support the proposed strategic dialogue between the 
United States, Japan, India and Australia, which had drawn considerable criticisms 
from the Chinese government (Smith & Yang 2008). Further distilling the previous 
tension between the two powers, the Chinese Minister reflected on the importance of 
"positive and constructive relationships between China and the United States and 
China and Japan"(Smith & Yang 2008). However, even despite dispersing the once 
significant tension surrounding the Australia-U.S. alliance, a number of difficulties 
still emerged.  
 
Throughout the remainder of its term, it became increasingly clear that the Rudd 
government was "deeply concerned about China's rising strategic and military 
influence" (Zhang 2007). In the following month, a foreign policy speech by Rudd 
reflected upon the need to "remain vigilant to changing strategic terrain" resulting 
from the regional impact of China's military modernisation (Dobell 2008). Later, in 
May 2009, the Rudd government's 2009 Defence White Paper, Defence 2030, 
explicitly stated that the extent of China's military expansion was particularly 
concerning, considering its potential to reach "beyond the scope of what would be 
required for a conflict over Taiwan" (DoD 2009, 34). According to some 
commentators, this hardened tone towards China help Rudd "shed his reputation as a 
‘panda hugger’ and establish an image of a China realist" (Tubilewicz 2010, 155). 
This strategic perspective on China would be later revealed to be "indicative of the 
hawkish private views of … Rudd", as contained in the leaked US Embassy cables 
(Manicom and O'Neil 2012, 218). Furthermore, while Beijing remained relatively 
passive in its public response to the White Paper (Australian Associated Press 
2009b), leaked documents revealed that Australian officials were "dressed down" by 
Chinese military officials demanding Australia to "make changes to the paper or 
suffer the consequences" (Khoo & Smith 2011, 135). The paper also drew 
considerable criticisms from Federal Opposition Leader, Malcolm Turnbull, 
suggesting that a major conflict with China was "something most people would 
regard as being very unlikely and realistic in the context of Australia's future … in 
the Asia Pacific" (Australian Associated Press 2009a). Consequently, this lack of bi-
partisan support suggests that Rudd's personal interpretation of the systemic 
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pressures of China's military ascendency acted a significant determinant of the 
government's antagonistic policy response.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the significant aspects of the Rudd government's foreign 
policy towards China, and its effect on the Sino-Australian relationship during this 
time. Despite inheriting a relatively stable relationship with China, with rapidly 
increasing levels of economic interdependence, the Rudd government's policy 
response to China negatively affected the Sino-Australian relationship. As a result, 
the personal impact of Rudd is evident throughout the case analyses of each of the 
core aspects of Australia foreign policy concerning China. In particular, despite the 
absence of aggressive regional moves by either of the powers, strategic tensions 
within the relationship arose out of Rudd's personal conviction of the necessity of 
containment measures to restrict China's rise. Similarly, tensions surrounding 
Chinese domestic insecurities arose, not out of aggressive Chinese actions, but 
antagonistic public statements made by Rudd.  
 
Rudd's antagonistic style of diplomacy with China is clearly indicative of the impact 
of leader agency on foreign policy. While technically responding to the systemic 
pressures brought about by China's economic and military expansion, Rudd's 
personal interpretation of these issues dramatically shaped the nature of Australia's 
policy response. Evidently, the case examination of the Rudd government's foreign 
policy towards China provides further evidence that the individual influence of 
leaders plays a causally significant role in determining the nature of policy responses 




V. Chapter 5: The Gillard Government (2010 - 2013) 
 
Introduction 
Similar to the Rudd government, the Gillard government only managed to hold 
office for a relatively short period of time. After taking her position as Australian 
Prime Minister, following a bitter internal leadership dispute in the Australian Labor 
Party (ALP), Gillard was initially quite reluctant to substantially change the direction 
of Australia’s foreign policy. Initially, these external affairs were instead left to Rudd, 
who was now relegated to the role of the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
However, as her term progressed, Gillard increasingly entered into a more 
international role, leaving behind a largely successful foreign policy legacy. Despite 
inheriting an almost identical economic and geopolitical relationship with China, 
Gillard's foreign policy seemed to invoke far less negativity from the Chinese 
government than her predecessor. With the exception of a few antagonistic issues 
involving the Australian-U.S. military alliance, the Gillard government oversaw a 
stable relationship with the Chinese. As a result, the Gillard government established 
a number of considerable economic and strategic agreements with the Chinese 
government that had not been possible under the prior Rudd regime. 
 
In keeping with the previous case analyses of the Howard and Rudd governments, 
this chapter empirically investigates the Gillard government's foreign policy 
direction towards China. Once more, in order to discern the causal significance of 
individual-level explanations of state behaviour, as compared to system-level and 
state-level explanations, the chapter examines the policy decisions and diplomatic 
behaviour of Australian Prime Minister, Julia Gillard. Further, in keeping with the 
theoretical frame of the overall study, the chapter attempts to identify the 
relationship and causal interaction between these levels-of-explanation. The chapter 
follows the same internal structure as the preceding case studies, and commences 
with an account of the political attributes of the Gillard government, and the personal 
attributes and policy contributions of Gillard. Following this, the chapter provides a 
case investigation of three aspects of the Gillard government's foreign policy towards 
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China, including: the management of the economic relationship; the response to 
Chinese domestic insecurities, such as territorial disputes and human rights issues; 
and strategic and defence policy. The case aspects analysed in this chapter suggest 
that the Gillard government's success in repairing the Sino-Australian relationship 
relied on Gillard downplaying the tensions between China and Australia, particularly 
in regards to Chinese domestic insecurities and strategic tensions. 
 
The Gillard government came to power on the 24th of June 2010, following a 
dramatic leadership spill within the ALP. The leadership spill saw, then Deputy 
Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, challenge the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, for the 
leadership of the Australian Labor Party. Once it became clear Gillard held the 
support of the majority of the ALP, Rudd resigned as Australian Prime Minister 
before the vote could occur, leaving Gillard unopposed (Curtis 2010).  As a result, 
Gillard became Australia's first female Prime Minister, and appointed Rudd to the 
position of Foreign Minister. While this appointment was largely reflective of Rudd's 
previous experience with Australian foreign affairs, it also possessed the added 
benefit of keeping Rudd at a distance from the rest of the government’s domestic 
political agenda. 
 
While Rudd was initially reported to have gracefully stepped down from his position 
as Prime Minister (Australian Broadcasting Commission 2010b), his reassignment to 
the role of Foreign Minister turned out to be quite controversial for the Labor Party. 
The disparity of language concerning China, between Gillard and Rudd, became a 
common theme throughout the Gillard administration's term. Rudd's confrontational 
language towards China as Foreign Minister, often contrasted with Gillard's own 
restrained diplomatic contributions. On multiple occasions, the comments made by 
the two minister's concerning China seemed to originate from entirely independent 
policy positions. Throughout the Gillard government's time in office, a number of 
damaging leaks were released to the Australian media from an anonymous source. It 
was widely suspected, yet not proven, that Rudd was responsible. Released by 
Channel Nine's Laurie Oakes, Gillard was revealed to have gone behind Rudd's back 
on a leadership deal and previously opposed then popular election promises (Jensen 
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2013). Furthermore, Rudd made repeated attempts to reclaim the leadership of the 
ALP, despite publicly stating that he had no desire to do so. As a result, the foreign 
policy of the Gillard government was placed under the considerable strain of a 
highly ambitious Foreign Minister. On the 22 February 2012, Rudd announced his 
resignation from the position as Minister for Foreign Affairs citing a lack of 
"confidence [from the] Prime Minister and her senior members" (Wright, Coorey & 
Miller 2012). On the 13th of March 2012, Senator Bob Carr was appointed the 
position of Foreign Minister (Australian Associated Press 2012). 
 
Professionally and personally, Gillard represented a stark comparison to Rudd. In 
contrast to Rudd's experience as a trained Sinologist, and consequent interest in 
diplomacy with China, throughout her university career, Gillard participated heavily 
in student politics and unionised student movements (Julia Gillard, n.d.). As a result, 
her political ascendance and the eventually governance of her ministry, reflected an 
engagement with party politics, as compared to Rudd's autocratic style of 
governance (Latham 2010, 26). Furthermore, a relative lack of experience both in the 
theory and practice of international diplomacy, presumably led to her initial 
reluctance to participate on the global stage, and her much criticised statement that, 
"foreign policy [was] not [her] passion" (Australian Broadcasting Commission 
2010c). However, as Gillard's term progressed, her competency on the world stage 
became increasingly acknowledged by the Australia media as repairing the damage 
done by Rudd. 
 
Economic Relationship 
The Gillard government is considered to have significantly strengthened the 
economic relationship between Australia and China. Presumably due to the 
government's propensity to play down the antagonistic aspects of the Sino-Australian 
relationship, the Gillard government had a number of economic successes with 
China. As compared to the previous government, commentators have suggested that 
despite Rudd's in-depth knowledge of China, Gillard's conservative posturing 
towards foreign affairs issues established Australia as a stable economic partner 
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(Kelly 2013). However, at the same time, much of the diplomatic posturing towards 
Australia by China was focused on these economic ties. 
 
In April 2011, during her first official visit to China, Gillard pledged the Australian 
government's commitment to re-invigorate Australia free-trade negotiations with 
China at "some pace" (Guy 2011). However, in September 2011, following a 
decision by the Australian treasury to impose a 'two-stage foreign approval process 
for resource exploration and mining' on 'foreign-government-related entities', 
Chinese business leaders warned of a boycott of investment in Australia (Garnaut 
2011b). In November 2011, Chinese state-owned media outlet, the Global Times, 
threatened that the Sino-Australian relationship risked getting "caught in the 
crossfire" of Sino-U.S. tensions, after Gillard supported a U.S. call for China to "play 
by the same [trade and investment] rules" as other countries (Kitney & Crowe 2011). 
Distancing himself from the administration's diplomatic tone, Rudd provided a quite 
antagonistic response to the Chinese criticisms, stating that the claims were 
unsubstantiated and the result of "self-serving propaganda"(Kitney & Crowe 2011). 
Tensions again rose in December 2012, when the Chinese ambassador warned 
Australia over its decision to ban Huawei from building a part of the national 
broadband network (Kerin 2012). It was later revealed that these tensions contributed 
to the further stalling of the eight year FTA negotiations between Australia and 
China. According to Trade Minister Craig Emerson, China marked the removal of 
foreign investment restrictions as non-negotiable conditions of the talks (Kerin & 
Gerritsen 2013). 
 
Even despite these tensions, the economic relationship still prospered. In April 2013, 
as a final and perhaps most significant development, the Gillard government 
succeeded in establishing a strategic partnership with the newly appointed Chinese 
leadership (Maher 2013). The partnership established annual leadership meetings 
between the two countries to discuss economic and foreign affairs issues. 
Furthermore, Gillard's second visit to China saw the announcement of a direct 
trading deal with Australian and Chinese currency, which Gillard hoped would spur 
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"new financial integration" between the countries (Australian Associated Press 
2013b). 
 
Response to Chinese Domestic Insecurities 
The Gillard government's diplomatic treatment of Chinese domestic insecurities was 
markedly less dramatic than that of both Rudd and Howard (particularly in his first 
term). In comparison to Rudd's first Prime Ministerial visit to China shortly after his 
election, Gillard's first visit to China occurred  almost a full year after her 
appointment as Prime Minister (Franklin 2011). The character of the visit also had a 
few noticeable differences. First, Gillard decided not to follow Rudd's example of 
excluding Japan in his visit to China, deciding instead to follow convention and meet 
China, Japan and South Korea in one trip (Franklin 2011). Secondly, the substance 
of Gillard's comments in China was significantly less antagonistic than Rudd's 'frank' 
discussion on human rights abuses in Tibet. Gillard instead opted to take a more 
diplomatic approach in breaching the topic in expressing that she hoped China was 
"not taking a backward step" on human rights (Garnaut 2011a).  
 
The restraint of Gillard comments on human rights abuses was particularly 
significant considering the fact that her visit closely followed the sentencing of 
Australian citizen, Matthew Ng, to 13 years in prison (Sainsbury 2011). According 
to Ng's family members, the charges of bribery and embezzlement were falsely 
accused and constructed by a business competitor (Sainsbury 2011). Similar issues 
also arose later in the Gillard government's term, following the suspicious arrests of 
Australian citizens, Du Zuying and Carl Mather. Du, an Australian surgeon and 
founder of successful Chinese company, China Biologic Product, was detained at 
Beijing Airport in February 2011 on charges of stealing money from a company 
(Garnaut & Wen 2012). According to the family, the charges were constructed to 
prevent Du claiming his 66% share holdings of his $US300 million company 
(Garnaut & Wen 2012). According to a comment by then Foreign Minister, Bob Carr, 
in reply to pleas by Du to raise the issue with Chinese officials it was deemed 
“inappropriate for the Australian government  ... to interfere in the legal processes of 
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other countries” (Garnaut & Wen 2012). Mather was arrested and detained in June 
2011 on charges of assault, after defending himself from four home invaders, one of 
which was locked in a bitter financial dispute with Mather's wife (Grigg 2013b).  
 
Unlike the public confrontation by Rudd concerning the imprisonment of Stern Hu, 
the Gillard government's response to the arrests were heavily restrained. According 
to lawyers of the defendants, the Australian government had repeatedly advised the 
accused that "megaphone diplomacy" would not help their case and that they should 
show restraint in contacting the media. Furthermore, statements from the lawyers 
suggested the Gillard government still “dared not express their opinions about the 
case strongly or clearly” (Grigg 2013b). However, in April 2013, this presumed 
policy of non-confrontation on human rights issues seemed to shift. A government 
briefing paper released during Gillard's visit placed issues, such as corruption and 




While Australia's defence policy towards and concerning China remained largely 
constant throughout the Rudd and Gillard governments, there were a number of 
notable differences between the two regime's policies. In particular, Rudd's 
antagonism towards the Chinese government seemed to be at odds with the Gillard 
government's overall policy strategy towards China (Walker 2010). However, 
following Rudd's resignation as Foreign Minister, the Gillard government went to 
great efforts in an attempt to distance itself from Rudd's legacy concerning China. 
The result of this is most adequately reflected in the Gillard government's issuing of 
the "Australia in the Asian Century White Paper" (Henry et al. 2012). In terms of 
domestic political tensions, the White Paper provided Gillard, a much needed "major 
foreign policy initiative" which did not originate from Rudd’s time in office 
(Hawksley & Georgeou 2013, 267). Furthermore, the substantive content of the 
White Paper noticeably avoided the antagonistic language of Rudd's foreign policy 
concerning China. Throughout the White Paper, the government attempted to 
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reposition Australia's strategic perception of China from that of underlying mistrust, 
as displayed in the 2009 Defence White Paper, to one emphasising the peaceful 
integration of China into the broader international community (Henry et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, the White Paper attempted to shift the national discussion on China 
sideways to a topic more familiar to Gillard, education. Reorienting the debate away 
from Rudd's 'brutal realism' concerning China (Hundt 2011, 277), Gillard 
emphasised the importance of education to Australia's engagement with a rising 
Asian region (Henry et al. 2012, 1-3).This shift in rhetoric is suggestive, both of 
Gillard's acknowledgement of the significance of a rising China for Australia's future, 
and the perception that Rudd's position was damaging to this relationship. This 
acknowledgment was further reflected when, prior to her second and final visit to 
China in April 2013, Gillard claimed that China was "absolutely pivotal to 
Australia's political, economic and strategic interests" (Australian Associated Press 
2013b). 
 
Nevertheless, a number of strategic tensions still arose between China and Australia 
over the period. The first point of geostrategic tension between Australia and China, 
during the Gillard government's time in office, drew upon the familiar strains of the 
Australia-U.S. alliance. Following the AUSMIN (Australia-United States Ministerial 
Consultations) talks in November 2010, Gillard reiterated Australia's full support for 
the deepening of Australia's strategic relationship with the U.S. (Kelly 2010). While 
the pledge elicited a comparatively mild response from China's state-owned media 
(Ma 2007), the tension was once again drawn upon in November 2011 when Gillard 
announced the stationing of up to 2500 U.S. marines in Darwin by 2017 (McDonell 
2011). According to the Chinese state-owned media, the agreement reflected a 
"backward-thinking" military strategy from the Cold War era (People's Daily Online 
2011), and that China would not "stand idly by" as the US strengthened its ties to the 
Asian region (Burrell 2011). In response, Rudd claimed in a television interview that 
Australia was not going to have its "national security policy dictated by any other 
external power" (Salna 2011). Additional Sino-Australia diplomatic tensions arose 
surrounding the Chinese territorial disputes over the South China Sea. Although 
Gillard's initial comments in November 2010 suggesting that the disputes ought to be 
resolved through "dialogue and diplomacy" (Kerin 2010) were largely 
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inconsequential, the Chinese government became increasingly agitated as 
international pressures emerged. In July 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
and Rudd discussed their support for renewed negotiations over the dispute, eliciting 
Chinese calls for non-interference (Alford 2011). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the significant aspects of the Gillard government's foreign 
policy towards China, and its influence on the overall Sino-Australian relationship. 
The replacement of Rudd as leader appears to have allowed the Gillard government 
to undertake a quite successful diplomatic campaign in repairing the relationship 
with China. In replacing the antagonistic diplomacy of Rudd, with Gillard's more 
reserved approach, the government allowed the Chinese government to dial back 
their response to tensions emerging between the two countries. Each aspect of 
Gillard's foreign policy concerning China involved the conscious attempt to 
downplay any emerging or existing tensions within the Sino-Australian relationship. 
This is particularly evident in the Gillard government's restraint in discussing the 
dubious arrests of multiple Australian citizens in China; the optimistic reorientation 
of Australia's strategic outlook concerning China; and, the establishment of a 
strategic partnership with the newly appointed Chinese leadership. While tensions 
regarding economic differences between Australia and China still emerged, the good 
will developed by these previous diplomatic efforts seems to have minimised the risk 
of Chinese retaliatory response. 
Furthermore, the dramatic change in approach exhibited by the Gillard government 
provides a compelling demonstration of the importance of the personal agency of 
leaders in changing foreign policy. Despite inheriting almost identical systemic 
conditions to the Rudd government, the character of the Sino-Australia relationship 
under the Gillard government changed considerably. Evidently, the influence of 
Gillard's personal interpretation of these systemic pressures contributed positively to 
the nature of the government's policy response. Hence, the respective systemic and 
domestic nature of the strategic and economic tensions which emerged, absent any 
antagonistic personal responses from Gillard, was able to be surpassed by number of 
alternative cooperative diplomatic engagements. 
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VI. Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
This study has examined the individual influence of the previous three Australian 
Prime Ministers on the Sino-Australian relationship. Positioned within the broader 
theoretical framework of the level-of-analysis problem, the findings reveal the 
impact of individual-level explanations on international political outcomes, 
specifically those relating to Australia. 
 
The comparative case studies of three Australian political regimes have provided the 
substance for this investigation, namely: the Howard government (11/03/1996 - 
03/12/2007); the Rudd government (03/12/2007 - 24/06/2010); and, the Gillard 
government (24/06/2010 - 26/06/2013). The analysis of each of these regimes has 
focused on the administration's policy response to Australia's economic relationship 
with China, the diplomatic treatment of Chinese domestic insecurities, and the 
reaction to China's military ascendency. In each case, this policy response has been 
measured in terms of its antagonistic or cooperative nature. 
 
In order to properly synthesise the findings of the study, the foreign policy outcomes 
of these policy responses will be considered in terms of the systemic, the state, and 
the individual levels-of-analysis. In keeping with the conceptual position set forth in 
Chapter 2, the explanations of these outcomes can now be considered in light of the 
interaction between each of the constitutive causes or forces. As revealed in the 
empirical study, certain trends emerged in the interaction between the systemic 
pressures of the international environment, and the personal influence of the leaders' 
individual interpretations and responses to that pressure. As a result, emergent trends 
within the foreign policy outcomes, as analysed in this study, will be attributed to 





For instance, the Howard government's support for the deployment of U.S. naval 
units during the Taiwan Strait Crisis could be observed, at the system-level of 
explanation, to be the strategic balancing against an aggressive regional neighbour. 
Support for this perspective could also be furthered by the case examples of the 
Howard government's subsequent attempts to 're-invigorate' the Australia-U.S. 
alliance, the antagonistic tone of the Rudd government's defence White Paper, and 
Gillard's support for the stationing of U.S. marines in Northern Australia. The 
argument here lies in the consistency of policy across all three political regimes. In 
this respect, the militarism of a rising power is impossible to ignore as an 
unavoidable consequence of anarchistic structure of the state system. As a result, the 
need to contain the threat of a rising China is objectively real, and thus each 
administration is forced to respond in a similar way. 
 
Alternatively, the decisions of the Howard and Gillard governments to play down 
human rights abuses in China, including the imprisonment of Australian citizens, 
could be seen in terms of a state-level of explanation. In this respect, the restrained 
diplomacy of the Howard and Gillard governments can be seen as an attempt to 
further prosper from a stable economic relationship with China. At the same time, 
such an attempt would seek to further China's integration with the global financial 
system, thus pacifying it in the process. This interpretation could be further 
supported by the Howard government's decision to remove Chinese dissidents from 
the public gallery, as well as outspoken members of parliament, during the Chinese 
president's address to the Australian parliament. Furthermore, the Rudd government's 
decision to impose investment guidelines on State-owned investors can be seen to 
reflect a desire to engage China in a liberal financial environment. This was then 
later reflected in the Gillard government's support of U.S. calls for China to 'play by 
the same rules'.  
 
However, in each of these interpretations of the case studies, significant anomalies 
have emerged. For instance, the Howard government's desire to re-invigorate the 
Australia-U.S. alliance, at the cost of its relationship with China, eventually 
diminished. Similarly, the antagonistic tone of Rudd's defence policy towards China 
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was essentially reversed during the Gillard government's time in office, despite 
responding to an almost identical security environment. Furthermore, the subtle style 
of diplomacy concerning China's various human rights abuses, demonstrated in the 
later years of the Howard government and throughout the Gillard government, was 
directly opposed to Rudd's 'frank' diplomatic style. 
 
Evidently, a considerable portion of Australia's foreign policy is determined by a 
degree of interpretation from the relevant policy makers. The consideration of the 
various personal attributes of Howard, Rudd and Gillard, provide a unique 
contribution to the narrative of Australia's foreign policy towards China. The case 
study of the Howard administration demonstrates the diplomatic evolution of 
Howard, responding to a process of learning the specific dynamics of the Sino-
Australian relationship. Initially rife with conflict, the Sino-Australian relationship 
under Howard transitioned to one of 'mutual interest and mutual respect'. The 
comparative case examination of the Rudd and Gillard government further revealed 
the influence of personality, experience and beliefs on foreign policy outcomes. 
Rudd's underlying suspicion of the Chinese government clearly influenced his 'brutal 
realism' towards China, and thus revealed itself in his antagonistic rhetoric. 
Conversely, Gillard's initial reluctance to engage with foreign affairs drew with it a 
more passive perception of China, and thus China responded positively.  
 
In conclusion, this study has revealed the causal significance of individual-level 
explanations of state foreign policy outcomes. In particular, the study has argued that 
Australia's foreign policy response to China's rise has been significantly determined 
by both system- and individual- level causes. However, the nature of this causal 
relationship relies on a particular form of interaction between the two levels of 
explanation. Specifically, the systemic pressures brought about by China's rise have 
clearly contributed to the overarching structure of Australia's foreign policy agenda. 
However, the specific qualities of the Australian policy response have clearly relied 




The content of these findings offers a crucial insight into the nature of the level-of-
analysis problem in IR. Explanations of international political outcomes provided at 
the system level-of-analysis clearly rely on the presence of specific behavioural 
dynamics at the individual level. In this case, Australia's policy response to the 
systemic pressures of China's rise relied on the ability of Australia's leaders to 
interpret and respond to those pressures in a particular way. Granted, it is essential 
that theories of foreign policy outcomes generalise observations, in order to abstract 
meaning from a complex reality. However, entirely dismissing a level of phenomena, 
for the purposes of analytical elegance, does little to ensure the explanatory 
adequacy of a theory. IR theorists should instead attempt to incorporate the 
significant aspects of international political outcomes into their research as 'relational 
points of causation'. In other words, the inclusion or exclusion of explanations of 
behaviour should be decided, not on the merits of the ontological status of their 
analytical level, but on their relative causal significance.  
 
As Australia continues to respond to China's rise, it would do well to consider the 
significance of this relationship between individual and systemic causes. While 
Australia's small stature may inevitably prevent it from shaping the international 
environment on a grand systemic scale, its policy response to China will have lasting 
effects. Domestically, Australia stands to prosper immensely through trade and 
investment ties with China, should it maintain a stable relationship into the future. 
However, as demonstrated, the prospects for this may be hindered if Australia's 
political leadership is unable to navigate the delicate procedure of diplomacy with 
the Chinese government. Internationally, Australia's policy response may be used to 
inform the strategies of a number of other countries looking to maintain a stable 
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